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Absconding for back pay is a serious phenomenon in China. Employees are 
usually put at a disadvantage when their legal rights as laborers are violated by their 
employers. Absconding for back pay ignores and severely destroys laborers’ interest, 
which not only does great harm but also bring unstable factor to society, greatly 
increasing social cost. However, provided by related law, employers only assume for a 
certain civil and administrative responsibility. Which substantially increase social cost 
to call employers to account. What’s more, high social cost and low penalty rate 
caused by punishing concerning employers and personnel according to their civil and 
administrative responsibility has failed the achievement of duty deterrence. In China, 
for the legislative deficiency in prohibiting back pay, to subject employers and 
responsible personnel to criminal prosecution, a “circuitous” application of criminal 
liability is required.  
Author holds that prevention should be put in the first place to prohibit a back 
pay from happening, namely to make clear punitive measure for them to foresee the 
consequences of acts, constituting a psychological deterrent to employers，which will 
greatly reduce the occurrence of back pay. In addition, absconding for back pay is so 
harmful that the government should regulate it with criminal penalty. The 
impossibility of perfect compensation has further the necessity of application of 
criminal penalty to back pay. Criminal regulation has been applied to cases of 
absconding for back pay and criminal liability made clear in Russia, Korea and Hong 
Kong, China. Employers can be convicted of crime if they abscond for back pay, 
which is feasible and complies with the principle of ‘ultima ratio of penalty’ The 
author puts forward some proposals on constitution of ‘abscond for back pay’. 
This thesis is presented in three chapters 
First chapter summaries legislative regulation for ‘abscond for back pay’, 
describes the prevalence, severity and danger of this problem, discusses legislative 
deficiency and high cost for rights protection. 
Second chapter probes into guilt and decriminalization of ‘abscond for back pay’, 
analyses the problem from the angle of economic law and comparative jurisprudence. 














economic law; it also presents cases of conviction for ‘abscond for back pay’ in some 
countries and areas in the world. 
   Third chapter illustrates the principle of ‘ultima ratio of penalty’ and necessity of 
conviction for ‘abscond for back pay’ in the sense of criminal regulation, discusses 
substantive rules construction of conviction for ‘abscond for back pay’. 
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第一章  欠薪逃匿行为法律规制问题概述 










的用人单位施加了不少的压力。福建省个私企业协会 2009 年 3、4 月份开展了《福
建省私营企业经营状况问卷调查》，其结果显示，福建私营企业认为当前对其经
营影响 大的负面因素是用工成本增加，本次问卷调查共有 5337 户私营企业参
加，占福建省私营企业总数的 2.6%，在关于“当前对企业经营影响 大的负面因





遍，而劳动者维权的方式也越来越激烈。”③2008 年 12 月 16 日，广东省劳动和
社会保障厅厅长向全国人大代表汇报时，建议设立欠薪逃匿罪以及建立欠薪保障
基金，加大对恶意欠薪逃匿的惩治力度。发生欠薪逃匿行为的企业通常为“三来
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 3
一补”的外向型企业，没有土地、厂房等固定资产，相对而言逃匿成本极低，“一
些企业甚至把欠薪逃匿当作牟利的手段”。①2009 年 3 月 11 日，全国政协委员、
广东省律师协会副会长提出，对于已发生的欠薪逃匿事件，现行法律无力追责逃
匿的企业主，因此，他已提交议案，建议我国《刑法》增设“欠薪逃匿罪”。 
根据山东省外经贸厅公布的数据，自 2003 年起，青岛地区有 206 家韩资企
业采取非正常手续撤离，涉及企业员工 2.6 万人，拖欠职工工资 1.6 亿元，拖欠
银行贷款近 7 亿元，在青岛，仅 2007 年便有 87 家韩国企业采取类似方式欠薪撤
离。2008 年 2 月 12 日，东莞市南城区石鼓村鸿声模具厂的台湾老板在春节前一




企业 277 家，数量是前几年的总和；拖欠工资总数达 4901 万元；广东深圳、东



























































体上访等过激行为的相关报道。2008 年初，河南省郑州市又发生了 6 名来自江
西的女油漆工“跳楼”讨薪事件，事后，他们受到公安部门的治安处罚，而欠薪者
却是“零成本欠薪”，这不仅有失法律的公正，也让一些用人单位有恃无恐，逃避
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